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Four factors are presented as explaining the nature and causes of revival: 1 support from international organizations; 2 oppression of the New Order regime; 3 the opportunities of Reformasi ; and 4 role of adat in the nationalistic political imagination. Is it true, as the cynical observers of indigenous identity believe p. While the editors realize that this is an extreme view, they tend to refuse any final coherence to culture because of their horror at its instru-mentalism. What is not instrumentalized?
What of the unending lies that the practice of democracy is forced to project? The editors show that the second cause of the revival of adat p. Under Soeharto, cultural difference and ethnic identity went unrecognized and were brutally punished if declared in the public sphere. After his fall , the reaction in areas of transmigration was one of renewed self-organization of the indigenous populations and, more rarely, pogroms towards immigrants.
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Once the top of the pressure cooker of the Soeharto decades was off, the Reformasi era provided of course positive opportunities p. The difficulty of creating new democratic institutions at the local level, the weakness of the existing legal system, and the threat of violence and disorder inclined people in many places to look to tradition as a course of both consensus and justice. Clearly, there are limits to the usefulness of an empowerment so locally focused as, inter alia , Warren shows p.
But local micro-holisms are nonetheless real social groups, and an improvement on the anarchy that the New Order left behind. If everything is treated as a question of empowerment, then there is no need to speak of any hierarchy of values, for power is the only value that characterizes social relations. Nor has adat , historically speaking, fulfilled its promise and therefore p. The editors seem to me to have provided a rich empirical collection of data that they would like to denigrate.
But what do they have to put in its place. Please choose www.
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Your GarlandScience. The student resources previously accessed via GarlandScience. Resources to the following titles can be found at www. Using case studies from both Southeast Asia and Western Europe between and , the book examines the haze, marine life protection, migration and terrorism. In the 21st Century, the Singaporean government has strategically renewed an existing form Baumann May 02, Drawing on a rich body of multimethod field research, this book examines the ways in which Indonesian and Philippine religious actors have fostered conflict resolution and under what conditions these efforts have been met with success or limited success.
The book addresses two central questions: In This book maps out the state of China Studies in seven Southeast Asian countries from different perspectives. To a large extent, this is due to the work of the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi KPK , Corruption Eradication Commission , which has had remarkable success in bringing to justice some high-profile politicians, bureaucrats, and business people.
One consequence of this is that the prosecution of corruption at the local level is characterized by arbitrariness and a seemingly random selection of corruption cases that are brought to court. Illuminating the dynamics behind these seemingly random processes is the main aim of this article. It will use detailed case study material from two provinces in eastern Indonesia to show under what circumstances exposure and prosecution of local corruption cases is likely.
Highlighting distinct patterns that appear to stand representative of broader trends in Indonesian local politics and law enforcement, the article argues that outcomes of corruption investigations at the local level are chiefly determined by the dynamics of local power politics rather than the efforts of anti-corruption activists or large-scale protests from social movements.
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Thus, the growing number of cases being exposed is not a sign of societal accountability, but should rather be seen as a reflection of the competitiveness of local politics and the need for local elites to continuously find new strategies to weaken their local rivals. To contextualize the case studies in broader discourses about anti-corruption movements, the article will begin with a brief review of the topical literature and an outline of the main differences in the interests and institutional capacities of key state and society actors at the national and local level in Indonesia.
The main objective of this first section is to identify some of the main reasons why an anti-corruption strategy centred predominantly on traditional, external control mechanisms, such as anti-corruption commissions, civil society, and the media, provides little hope to tackle local-level corruption effectively.
All forms of corruption are global phenomena that occur in countries with very different political systems and levels of economic development. However, the combination of liberal democracy and high levels of economic development provides powerful obstacles for corruption to thrive, 2 whereas non-democratic countries or those that have only had limited exposure to democratic values and institutions tend to be more prone to corruption Pellegata That said, it should also be noted that while consolidated, liberal democracies often have low levels of perceived corruption, newly democratizing countries, especially those that are concurrently liberalizing their economic systems, are often susceptible to high levels of corruption Stephenson The case of Indonesia, where the number of corruption cases appears to be growing every year since the beginning of democratization, is therefore by no means unique.
As widely as corruption is spread around the globe, as plentiful are efforts that seek to better understand the root causes of corruption and to devise strategies to contain it. Critics of this approach, however, argue that these efforts are misguided, because they are based on false assumptions about the appeal of liberal anti-corruption norms and the potential of formal rules to induce behavioural change by political actors Collier A study about the failure to curb corruption in Kenya and Uganda, for example, has found that in countries where corruption has reached systemic levels, principal-agent approaches are destined to fail because it is not only the agents who are corrupt, but also the supposedly honest principals Persson, Rothstein and Teorell Corruption, so the authors of this study argue, should therefore not be conceptualized as a principal-agent problem, but rather as a collective-action problem.
Meanwhile, a report by the Institute of Development Studies stresses the need to recognize that informality is not always part of the problem, but should actually be utilized as a crucial part of the solution. As Van Klinken points out, clientelistic networks are ubiquitous at the local level, yet they are not merely oppressive but can also fulfil integrative functions by connecting people and building social capital. Yet another criticism often levelled at anti-corruption initiatives is that they are too strongly focused on national institutions and actors Davidson , while overlooking or misinterpreting different political constellations at the sub-national level.
Despite the paucity of strong empirical evidence that internationally supported anti-corruption programmes are actually curbing corruption, many external donors still regard formal institutional change as the best instrument against corruption. The menu of measures usually applied comprises various strategies that are directly targeted at reducing the potential for corruption, either through internal or external control mechanisms Brunetti and Weder ; Hamilton-Hart Internal control mechanisms are formal and informal rules and regulations that are used to control corruption from inside an organization, for example by prioritizing meritocratic principles over clientelism or by providing incentives to increase honest behaviour.
In contrast to measures that seek to induce behavioural and attitudinal change from within, external control mechanisms originate outside a particular organization and focus on oversight, auditing, naming and shaming, and, ultimately, the punishment of corrupt officials. Only some of these external mechanisms are a formal part of the state for instance, the police, the Office of the Attorney General, or the courts whilst others are created by the state but operate independently for instance, specially established anti-corruption commissions or audit institutions or emerge and exist outside the state for instance, a free press and independent media organizations or watchdog organizations rooted in civil society.
In regards to the latter, the role of the state is merely to pass legislation that provides the kind of enabling environment in which civil-society organizations and the media can thrive. Generally, the main aim of creating and strengthening external control mechanisms is to supply more and better information to the public and provide deterrents to corruptors in the form of greater sanctioning power for both the public and the law enforcement apparatus.
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The overall track record of such initiatives, however, has been mixed. Anti-corruption commissions in particular have often failed to perform in line with the expectations of anti-corruption movements, as is evident, for example, in several Asian countries including Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines Quah Significantly, the Indonesian case has often been described as an exception to this rule of failure Bolongaita In Indonesia, the fight against corruption is driven primarily by forces exogenous to the state apparatus. State institutions, on the other hand, have remained notoriously silent in the public debates about corruption, and resistant to internal reforms.
Despite a few notable exceptions such as, for example, the Ministry of Finance under former minister Sri Mulyani — , efforts to reform the state bureaucracy have been half-hearted at best McLeod , and many government departments and law enforcement institutions are still widely regarded as highly corrupt.
This leaves the onus of the fight against corruption in the hands of activists, journalists, and the committed investigators of the KPK. The most prominent anti-corruption institution in Indonesia is without a doubt the KPK. Equally important, it has been indiscriminate in its selection of cases, pursuing high-profile corruptors ranging from bureaucrats and businesspeople to legislators, embassy staff, and heads of local governments Butt The bolder the KPK became over the years, the more frequent became the attempts to weaken it Mietzner Perhaps the most far-reaching attack on the institutional integrity of the KPK and the anti-corruption courts has come in the form of the revised law on the anti-corruption court, which was passed in parliament in late The revision became necessary after an earlier version of this law had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
Legislators now used this opportunity to draft a law that clearly jeopardized the effectiveness of the KPK -driven fight against corruption. As will be discussed below, this decentralization of the courts has indeed brought with it several problems and damaged the reputation of the anti-corruption courts. Overall, however, the KPK has, despite these challenges from political elites, retained its unrivalled position as the chief instrument for fighting corruption in Indonesia, defying concerns expressed in the early years of its existence that it may follow in the footsteps of similar bodies in Thailand and the Philippines and soon become irrelevant Davidson Today, it continues to enjoy broad public support and has built strong relationships with two other key pillars of the anti-corruption fight: the media and civil-society groups.
Over the years the KPK has built strong relationships with civil-society groups, another crucial external control mechanism Setiyono and McLeod Especially NGO s like ICW and PSHK , which were established in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Soeharto and thus earlier than the KPK , have been at the forefront of the anti-corruption struggle, conducting invaluable work in uncovering corrupt practices in government, parliament, and the bureaucracy. Leaders of the most prominent groups are frequent guests in talk shows and thus highly visible mouthpieces of the anti-corruption movement.
At the societal level, the NGO s organize seminars and workshops for community leaders and act as vehicles through which ordinary people can channel their aspirations to fight corruption. As one of the biggest and best-organized groups, ICW also administers a comprehensive website www. Thus, at the national level, NGO s perform many crucial functions—though, as will be detailed below, few of these groups possess roots in society beyond Jakarta.
The third and final pillar of the fight against corruption in Indonesia are the mass media, which have assisted the KPK and NGO s in their work through their willingness to publicize reports and findings from investigations, provide space for interview snippets, and invite activists to write newspaper columns and appear in talk shows and newsrooms.
Some media outlets regularly conduct their own investigations into corrupt practices, first and foremost Tempo newsmagazine, which has a long tradition of independent, unbiased reporting Steele Long before former party chairman Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq was arrested by the KPK in early , the magazine had already pointed to dubious procurement practices in the import of beef to Indonesia Tempo While the role of newsmagazines like Tempo is significant, the ability of the press to frame public perceptions of corruption is much smaller than that of the electronic media.
Television in particular is crucially important, because the vast majority of Indonesians nowadays receives their knowledge of political events from national TV stations. But the role of many television stations is also much more ambivalent than that of the press. On the one hand, the electronic media contribute to greater awareness of corruption, as they frequently deliver broadcasts directly from the KPK building and host studio discussions about corruption, its impact, and the efforts to combat it.
On the other hand, however, many television stations—especially the news channels Metro TV and TV One, which are owned by ambitious politicians—are also highly selective in their coverage for political reasons, while other channels trivialize critical issues by presenting them as sensationalist infotainment Kramer Compared to the national level, the anti-corruption instruments available to monitor local politics are far less sophisticated, especially in the more remote areas of eastern Indonesia.
They still are. Challenging these entrenched networks and their corrupt practices at the local level has been extremely difficult, because here, in contrast to the national level, the virtual absence of internal control mechanisms is exacerbated by concurrent, serious deficiencies in the three most important external control mechanisms. To begin with, the two key legal institutions involved in the fight against corruption—the KPK and the anti-corruption courts—are not fully functional at the local level.
Similarly, the anti-corruption court was initially also confined to Jakarta. The new law was not only significant because it stipulated the establishment of anti-corruption courts at the provincial level, but also because it transferred jurisdiction for all, not just some, corruption cases to the anti-corruption courts, including the new courts at the provincial level. Legislators portrayed the regionalization of the court as an initiative to strengthen the fight against corruption.
In reality, however, it represented a setback for the anti-corruption fight, because the integrity of the new local courts was never going to be as high as that of the Jakarta court. Indeed, several problems ensued including difficulties with the recruitment of suitable judges and the apparent involvement of some local anti-corruption court judges in corruption. Perhaps most damaging for the public eye, however, has been the fact that, in contrast to the Jakarta court, the new local courts soon acquitted a number of defendants.
Many eastern Indonesian provinces, by contrast, are conspicuous only by their absence from the list. The key problem for the KPK in its investigations at the local level is that in order to be successful it needs reliable allies on the ground. Local prosecutors are usually unsuitable for this role, as they are either too inert, too incompetent, or too corrupt to initiate and complete an investigation.
The larger Jakarta-based groups, meanwhile, have insufficient capacities to get involved directly in anti-corruption activities in remote areas, although Kuris points out that groups like ICW often act as intermediaries between the KPK and individual local activists. In fact, it is individual activists who tend to be the most important transmitters of information in the fight against local graft. The reliance on such individuals, however, can be problematic. In small, provincial towns, knowledge about the wheeling and dealing of local elites is a commodity that can be utilized in multiple ways.
Channelling this knowledge to the KPK may be one option, but there are also a growing number of former activists who prefer to use their knowledge about local politics to gain access to influential positions in parties and the bureaucracy. Others are joining the bandwagon of public polling and consulting, opening locally based businesses or working as local surveyors for Jakarta-based consultancies.
What these men and women have in common is that they have become part of the very networks that the anti-corruption groups seek to dismantle. Many activists accept that because the government is the only avenue to a job. Thus, many activists are co-opted into the system; once they are identified as smart and critical, they are absorbed into the system. Utilizing the knowledge of these informants more systematically could be an important step forward, but better legal protection for whistleblowers would be needed for this to occur. The fight against corruption outside Jakarta is further complicated by the ambivalent role played by many regional media outlets.
In contrast to the media landscape in the capital, where newspapers and TV stations have been influential in building and maintaining public support for the KPK , media outlets in small, provincial towns are far less effective in assisting the anti-corruption fight. While the practice is also widespread at the national level, it is near universal at the local level, where journalists and local elites, especially government elites, are linked to each other in intricate webs of mutual dependence.
This mutual dependency is routinely reinforced through the provision of envelopes with money and other bribes. Another problem is that local journalists often lack the professional and organizational skills necessary for thorough investigative reporting. Especially the smaller local newspapers that were established directly in the regions by local media entrepreneurs often employ journalists with little experience and few opportunities for professional development.
The professional standards are somewhat better in the bigger papers that are affiliated with national media conglomerates such as the Jawa Pos Group or the KompasGramedia Group, but even the best journalists rarely receive enough organizational and logistical support from their employers to conduct serious investigations into corrupt practices in their home provinces. In fact, editorial boards and some senior journalists often act as gatekeepers to prevent the publication of stories that are deemed too critical towards powerful local elites.