- So How About That Polygamy? Time to Talk About It?
- Polygyny:: He Was Mine. Now He's Ours. by Meshiyah Young | NOOK Book (eBook) | Barnes & Noble®
- Polygyny:He Was Mine. Now He's Ours.
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But we want it to get out to the larger public. And the Jewish nation is harmed by it. This is national discrimination, where the state turns a blind eye to Beduin, who freely take more wives. If Jews do, they are thrown into prison. In the ad, Sopher noted his group had a rabbinical court working with it on the issue. The head of that court is Rabbi Dov Stein of Jerusalem, who also serves as secretary for the nascent Sanhedrin project. They are miserable. In a homosexual scenario there are two people who decide to live their life that way.
Here a person is putting two women into a conflict. Harrar also doubted the fact that this could be seen as a trend. But in modern Israel, a rabbinic court would not allow a Yemenite man to take another woman, even when his barren wife insisted that she wanted him to, he said. A rare case in which a second wife would be allowed would be if the first one were in a coma, and it would be impossible to divorce her according to Jewish law. Arusi was concerned that such a phenomenon would increase the rates of unregulated marriages and divorces in Israel, which could lead to severe pedigree problems.
They are not solving problems, rather creating them. By registering marriage in Israel, we can monitor things and ensure there are no mamzerim [people forbidden to marry according to Halacha] marrying. Can we have that supervision with unregulated weddings? And how can one be sure that the divorce carried out for such a person who wed off the books would be entirely by Jewish law?
Arusi said his committee would examine the issue in its next meeting. As one of our loyal readers, we ask you to be our partner. Share on facebook Share on twitter. Related Content. August 28, In order to determine whether the effect of any given outcome was related to polygyny independent of the leading other explanatory vari- ables, we also controlled for the wealth of a country, measured in gross domestic product in U. This is because, all else being equal, we would expect, and indeed we find, that, on average, women do better in wealthier countries.
This should not be a surprise; when there are more resources, there is more to go around. However, it is absolutely crucial to recognize that many wealthy countries still show very high rates of vio- lence against women in various forms, from domestic violence and rape to murder, as well as other negative outcomes.
A word of caution needs to be inserted here about the relationship between country wealth and data collection in general, but especially regarding issues related to women. Discrepancies in national wealth can make it difficult to calibrate data across countries because richer countries are more likely to care about, and spend money to collect, data on vari- ables affecting women.
So, in an odd perversion, it can look like Sweden is way worse on some measure of violence than, say, Nigeria simply because Sweden spends a lot of resources to record every case and collects accu- rate data whereas many poorer countries do not have the resources, and sometimes do not have the interest, to collect such data. So researchers need to be very careful about accepting at face value cross-cultural data, particularly regarding women.
Such data can reflect a lot of deeply embed- ded cultural values, and they may not be an accurate reflection of what is really taking place on the ground. That is why, for example, WomanStats is careful to record both law and practice, because they often run in oppo- site directions, particularly in nondemocratic or poorer countries. We also conducted a control for sex ratio, but because it did not prove statistically significant over and above the effects of polygyny in any of our analyses we did not include those analyses in the bulk of our presen- tations.
The reason for this likely has to do with age structure, because sex ratio includes older women past reproductive age, and, on average, women live longer than men so there are more of them at older ages. However, the existence of these women would not be expected to drive the effects we examine here because they are past the reproductive age at which men compete for women, and this is the crucial factor that theoretically should drive the effects on violence we examine, for the rea- sons described above.
Because these effects turned out as expected, there was no independent statistical effect for sex ratio, and because polygyny drove the findings, I will not say any more about that here except to note that we did control statistically for whether that factor alone was driving our effects.
We then examined the effect of polygyny on a large variety of depen- dent variables related to the health of women and children and the secu- rity and stability of the overall nation-state. This allowed us to compare the effects of low versus high levels of polygyny on various outcomes. And we looked at a lot of different outcomes. We exam- ined the effect on female genital mutilation, measured on a scale from 0 to 2 where 0 denotes virtually no women are subjected to such cutting and 2 coded in cases where more than half of women in that country are subjected to such practices.
We also examined rates of sex traffick- ing, average age of marriage, birth rates, and female life expectancy. In addition, we looked at rates of maternal mortality measured in terms of deaths per one thousand live births. We also considered differences in the rates of male versus female HIV rates in a country. For factors affecting children, we looked at rates of both primary and secondary education for both boys and girls.
Recall that polygyny benefits a minor- ity of men, and hurts a majority of boys, who must be thrust out of the marriage market in order to sustain asymmetric access to women, so although it works out well for a minority of wealthy men, it hurts most boys and men. We also examined several factors that affected domestic state—level sta- bility and equality. Specifically, we looked at measures from WomanStats that ranked inequity in family law, which ranks the degree to which privi- lege in such things as inheritance, child custody, and divorce favors men over women.
We also looked at discrepancy between law and practice that measures, for example, the extent to which there may be a law on the books that prohibits marriage before the age of sixteen or makes rape a crime, and yet these laws are rarely if ever enforced. Finally, we looked at factors that may influence the international stabil- ity and security of a state. In this regard, we examined defense expendi- tures on weapons made by a country in a given year, as well as the degree of civil rights and political liberties enjoyed by the citizens of a particu- lar country, using the standard measures from the political science litera- ture, as documented in the technical chapter on these findings.
It should be noted that the real outlier in this analysis is the United States simply because American weapons expenditures so far outweigh any other coun- try on the globe. As polygyny increases, the age of marriage for women declines, often well into childhood, while birth rates and rates of maternal mortality increase and overall life expectancy decreases. In short, polygyny costs a lot of women and children their lives. The mechanism by which this occurs is enforced by biological exi- gencies: births to young mothers are much riskier, and short interbirth intervals, where children are born less than eighteen months apart, also raise risks for all kinds of maternal problems.
Such births increase rates of birth defects as well. Although we were not able to obtain sufficient data to look at interbirth interval, other studies indicate that this declines in highly polygynous environments. As a result, when a girl is married very young—an outcome that benefits the father who wants the resources or alliance such a marriage entails, and the husband who increases his confidence of obtaining a disease-free virgin where his paternity rights are secure, as well as whatever intrinsic pleasure he may derive from having sex with a very young girl—she is less able to carry a healthy baby to term than say an eighteen- or twenty-year-old.
She will likely be very fertile because of her age and so will get pregnant quickly after giving birth, hav- ing short interbirth intervals. Now some women may trade off productive and reproductive work by trading the timing of agricultural and childbirth responsibilities with other women in a family; however, that is only likely in environments where women work in agriculture, for example, and are not simply secluded by great wealth where such considerations would not come into play.
In addition to these effects on mortality itself, polygyny affects morbid- ity as well. As polygyny increases, rates of sex trafficking increase, rates of female genital mutilation increase, rates of domestic violence increase, and sex difference in HIV infection, such that many more women than men become infected, increases as well. Effects on children fare no better. Rates of both primary and secondary education decline for both girls and boys as rates of polygyny rise. And the negative effects of polygyny are not restricted to the micro unit of the family. Rather, polygyny exerts profound and widespread societal impact as well.
Specifically, as rates of polygyny rise, inequity in family law increases, as does discrepancy between law and practice. Where polygyny rates are high, civil liberties decline, as do political rights. This makes sense because it requires a great deal of political, institutional, and cultural oppression to control the productive and reproductive capacity of half the population.
There are, of course, other factors that may be associated with polyg- yny that we were not able to explore. For example, we did not have suf- ficient coverage across countries on rates of prostitution or pornography to examine the effect of polygyny on these outcomes. While it is certainly theoretically possible that there are some positive features associated with polygyny, all of the cases we have heard remain anecdotal in nature.
We were not able to find a single one that could be supported at an aggre- gate level statistically. Jonathan Cowden did an incredibly meticulous and diligent analysis of all these data in both empirical pieces in this volume chapters 3 and 4. The findings are clear, consistent, and statistically robust across the board. In fact, the results are the kind of thing most social scientists strive for but almost never find in the course of their careers.
If these findings were about something not related to women, chances are that they would be treated as revolutionary in international relations theory; indeed, the effects are much stronger than those supporting the notion of the demo- cratic peace that has spawned an entire cottage industry of inquiry. I leave it to the reader to ponder why powerful effects regarding the treatment of women on the health and security of states do not receive such extensive attention. Canadian Trial Sometimes, however, real life does pay attention to scholarly efforts.
She told me about the polygamy ref- erence case they were working on, for which they needed someone who had statistical data on polygyny. She asked me if I might consider working as an expert witness for them on this case. By this time, I had done a lot of work on polygyny, so I agreed. The trial took place in Vancouver near Christmas in , and it was a truly fascinating experience for me. In Canada, the laws are somewhat dif- ferent from those of the United States, so standing is not necessary to bring suit; reference trials can take place adjudicating the constitutionality of a law without someone experiencing harm as a result of it.
So How About That Polygamy? Time to Talk About It?
The team helped prepare me for my testimony and supported me throughout my experi- ence. The most amazing thing to me about this trial is that the majority of the expert witnesses for the other side made points that were entirely consistent with my own analysis, making me wonder why they had been called.
I testified for parts of a couple of different days and presented the data, analysis, and graphs that appear in chapter 3. I explained the work I had done and the findings that came out of the analysis. The opposing side that cross-examined me had some strategies to try to unnerve and distract me in the courtroom, but none came close to being as disturbing as teach- ing a large class of undergraduates glued to their iPhones, so I found none of it problematic.
The trial was stopped for a period shortly after my testimony when the Canadian Royal Mounties indeed found and stopped an incidence of sex trafficking. They discovered that several young girls were being sent from the Bountiful community of Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints to a related group across the border in Utah, demonstrating in a very real way one of the effects about which I had just testified.
The judge was, in my opinion, a serious and thoughtful person trying hard to weigh the relative merit of arguments that rested primarily on the importance of freedom of religion on the one hand and the documented negative consequences of polygyny on the other. He took almost a year to render his decision, which was not surprising given that the material the case generated took up the entirety of a small room.
In the end, he sided with upholding the constitutional prohibition of polygamy, the side for which I had advocated. I had not realized how influential this decision was for other areas of Canadian law until several years later when I was teaching a gradu- ate seminar. There was a Canadian political theory student in the class, and for some reason the discussion veered into freedom of religion. He then started talking about legal restrictions on freedom of religion akin to those on free speech that prevent people from falsely screaming fire in a crowded theater.
The case started to sound eerily familiar until I realized he was talking about the polygamy reference trial. You are the harm person. He then proceeded to explain that the larger implication of the case was that it supported cir- cumscribing freedom of religion in cases where such liberty could render undue harm on individuals because the state had a substantial interest in preventing such harm. Obviously, the overarching principle here may remain controversial, but I agree that this decision weighs on the right side of both law and virtue.
I was extremely proud of this work. It was one of the few times in my life where I felt the academic work I had done had achieved an impor- tant real-world outcome and might have helped, however marginally, to improve the lives of some people over time. It was an extremely gratifying feeling.
Experimental Study Once the widespread and negative consequences of polygyny were clear, the next obvious step was to embark on a process of trying to discover and uncover some of the underlying causes of these practices. When I embarked on a project designed to examine the nature of atti- tudes toward sexual inequality in various countries around the world, I realized this project offered an opportunity to explore some of the poten- tial sources of attitudes toward polygyny in that context. The larger study is an embedded experiment, meaning that an experimental manipulation is embedded in a nationally representative sample.
Polygyny:: He Was Mine. Now He's Ours. by Meshiyah Young | NOOK Book (eBook) | Barnes & Noble®
For many of the ques- tions regarding other topics, like health and education, the manipulation asks some individuals to make the decision about their daughter and others about their son; they are not aware that different people get dif- ferent versions of the question, and thus we can traction the differences between respondents to examine the effect of sex on their attitudes in cer- tain domains.
In the case of the polygyny question, we made it a bit more complicated, asking people if a man who wants to take a second wife should do so, where in one case his first wife approves and in the other case she objects. In our study, the samples were representative by sex and religion, meaning the population we examined accurately reflected the overall percentages of those groups in the broader society. This design allows us to gain both control and validity in our study. In this examination, which appears in chapter 4, we surveyed about 1, in each of several countries including Lebanon, Jordan, Uganda, Indonesia, and several provinces of India Bihar, Punjab, Kerala, and Delhi to include over ten thousand respondents.
This large grouping allowed us to examine the effect of sex and religion as potential sources in creating underlying attitudes toward polygyny. We found that religion did not have as much of an influence as people might have thought but, not surprisingly, sex does have an effect, with women in general much less likely to support polygyny than men regardless of the condition.
The Meaning and Meanness of Polygyny 27 Policy Implications I understand I was chosen as the first Easton Lecturer in part because my work does not fit into traditional frameworks or paradigms. The work on polygyny certainly falls into that category.
Polygyny:He Was Mine. Now He's Ours.
Indeed, I have never conducted any work in my career that has aroused such consistent, extreme, and visceral opposition. Ironically much of this indignation ema- nates from so-called feminists in particular. In my experience, many of them dismiss my data without presenting anything more substantial than anecdotes on the other sides of the equation.
Much of this misguided fem- inist criticism originated in political correctness, a misdirected attempt to respect cultural diversity without recognition of the consequences of such respect for protecting basic human rights, human dignity, and female health and welfare. The opposition rests mostly on arguments that priv- ilege personal choice and freedom. Of course we know examples of peo- ple who happily reside in polyamorous households in the United States or other Western, industrialized developed countries. This is very different from the kinds of circumstances or environments in which most women in polygynous marriages around the globe exist.
Such women have no voice, and no opportunity for exit, since they are wholly socially and financially dependent on the men in their lives because they are con- sistently denied education and financial independence. Such a situation could not be more different from that of a bisexual woman in Cambridge with a PhD, making a couple of hundred thousand dollars a year, who decides to live with both her male and female lovers. Those privileged women should not assume that their lives and choices reflect in any way whatsoever the circumstances of violence and oppression that character- ize the lives of their poor, uneducated sisters throughout the world.
Many privileged women focus on notions of personal freedom both because they do not fully understand the kinds of circumstances endured by most women in polygynous marriages around the world and also because they themselves consider choice so important in their own lives, as indeed it is. This is what many people who focus on choice fail to fully accept. None of these privileged women would want to live a life of fear and deprivation, as the vast majority of women around the world do, but they are not forced to do so. Yet their polygynous sisters do not have a similar choice to leave their lives for alternative ones of privilege.
While a position privileging personal choice and freedom may easily make sense in wealthy, educated populations where women have independent resources and can exit situations not to their liking, this is not the reality in the vast majority of polygynous unions around the globe where women are given or sold in marriages before they reach the age of majority and remain financially and socially dependent on men who may abuse them.
In such circumstances, notions of personal choice and freedom remain lit- tle more than chimeras. For example, in the Canadian trial, I heard per- sonal testimony from people who said that naked baby girls would be held under freezing cold running water until they stopped crying in order to get them to keep quiet. Anyone who knows anything about normal, healthy child development realizes that these are precisely the conditions that would make a normal child cry.
It would take a lot for a child to learn to be quiet in this torturous situation, but likely only one trial learn- ing to never make noise again so as to avoid such horrible abuse. If such children are conditioned by such abuse to be quiet and submissive prior to the time they even develop language, then we can hardly expect them as they grow older to challenge their fathers and husbands in the same way that a highly educated woman from a healthy family of origin would be expected to do.
These abused women most often lack the education, resources, or wherewithal to leave circumstances of oppression and abuse should they wish to do so. They would have nowhere to go, no one to turn to, and no resources to support them. Further, many of the areas where such practices are endemic lack the variety of state and private safe houses that exist in much of the industrialized world. Such circumstances limit rather than enhance prospects for personal freedom and security. The second point of opposition usually rests on arguments about respect for cross-cultural differences in norms and values.
This certainly constitutes a valid point, but here is where reasonable people can disagree, and I tend to side with the Canadian chief justice. It is not only justifiable but also incumbent on those who claim to value the lives of women to speak out against these practices. Support for such practices serves only to perpetuate the patterns of abuse and violence they engender and support.
In this regard, I was particularly struck by B. To me, that recognition encompassed every- thing meaningful regarding the profound and pervasive negative impact of polygyny on women, children, and the security, freedom, and stability of a state. This is not to say that polygyny is the only, or even the single most important, cause of violence or other kinds of political pathology or domestic calamity. Many social structures harm women and children and help precipitate violence; unfortunately, the sources of such violence result from multiple sufficient causation.
Viewed from this perspective, polyg- yny constitutes a sufficient but not necessary cause of the many kinds of harm detailed throughout this volume. In this way, polygyny represents one potential cause of many, enough on its own to cause the systematic, diverse, and myriad negative consequences noted here; however, there are unfortunately many other structural factors that alone and in com- bination can precipitate similar widespread damage.
These factors range from cultural biases, such as patriarchy, through to normative constraints, which include the existence of laws that either permit or encourage sys- tematic discrimination against women, most notably in the area of family and reproductive law. Along with polygyny, some of the most important structural factors contributing to widespread and systematic bias against women include, but are not limited to, patrilocality Hudson et al.
So what are the broader policy implications of these findings? At least several important ramifications are worthy of consideration. First, these findings suggest that conventional female empowerment techniques, such as education alone, may not work to free women from male social and economic control in many parts of the world. But it is also important to recognize that reading material can often be con- trolled by men, and so literacy in isolation may not necessarily increase female empowerment or financial independence. But again, there is some suggestive evidence from places like India that as the household gets richer, men prevent their wives from working, since having a wife who does not work gives them status with other men.
This then serves further to isolate and restrict the freedom of movement of many of these women. So again, loans alone may help, but loans may not prove the panacea to development woes many hope they will provide. Finally, it can be very difficult to advocate for Western values such as monogamy when such efforts may simply appear as implicit latter- day forms of colonial oppression, imposing foreign values on coun- tries that do not espouse them.
However, it is important to recognize the importance of restricting polygynous practices if we truly want to improve basic human rights, such as health, and mitigate the injustice that follows from deep forms of gender inequality. It may be that such efforts must emanate from within cultures that embrace these practices, and such efforts may begin with the men who are deprived of wives altogether or as a secondary consequence of objections to tremendous inequality in overall wealth.
I never would have guessed that a project begun so casually in response to a question from a respected mentor would lead to such a long and robust research path, although admittedly that is not the first time some- thing like that has happened. I have learned a great deal along the way and have been blessed by some amazing and committed collaborators.
I must say that my data have depressed me. They have made me, if possi- ble, more cynical than I already was about human nature and our capac- ity to be kind or generous toward one another. But this project has also convinced me more than ever that if we want to change the world, we must begin by changing ourselves. Nor do they come out of nowhere. Children listen, and they learn from what they see around them. Why should we be surprised that children come to believe that might equals right because that is the relationship they see between their mothers and father?
Children do not outgrow such developmental dis- turbances. Instead, they carry such a paradigm of inequality and vio- lence into their larger personal, professional, and social lives and seek to re-create hierarchies of dominance that are natural, but also learned. The importance of incorporating such factors, which are too often over- looked or ignored, into any comprehensive analysis of large-scale soci- etal problems constitutes the next chapter of this volume, coauthored with Peter K.
We can analyze ISIS and similar and past extremist groups in terms of radical religious beliefs all we want, and that indeed may tell part of the story. But it does not tell the entire story. The fact that such groups recruit and use sex slaves and seek to enslave women under their charge is not accidental. It is part of their philosophy and purpose. Polygyny promotes weaker and more superficial marital bonds by its very nature, if only because of limited attention and distraction. As long as the bond between husband and wife is weak relative to the bond between mother and son, then violence against women will promulgate at higher rates.
All these processes sit on a fundamental foundation of male coalitionary psychology that privileges group cohe- sion over dyadic engagement, contrary to female psychology, which tends to privilege pair bonds. Yet while male and female reproductive drives, and the psychological processes such instincts entrain, often do not fit very well with each other, both sides want to raise their children success- fully, on average.
This is the place where rational and emotional interest can coalesce and intervene to encourage parents to join in reducing the intergenerational transmission of the kind of gender-based violence that compromises the prospects for peace in the future for all of us. Daly, Martin, and Margo Wilson. Dickeman, Mildred. Gray, J. Gray, Peter B. Kahlenberg, Emily S. Barrett, Susan F. Lipson, and Peter T.
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Hirschman, Albert O. Hudson, Valerie M. Hurtado, A. Hewlett, 31— New York: de Gruyter. Irons, William. Chagnon and William Irons, — Maslow, Abraham H. The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. New York: Viking. Mazur, Allan, and Alan Booth. Mazur, Allan, and Joel Michalek. Van den Berghe, Pierre L. The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Praeger. Hatemi This chapter explains the why and the how of the methodology we used to explore this topic of polygyny.
In short, the answers we discover are largely shaped by the kinds of questions we ask, and those questions are in turn formulated by the types of methods we employ to examine our issues of concern. We wanted to explicate this tradition in detail here to help illuminate why we examine the questions we do the way we do in subsequent chapters.
Many of the early and important developments in political-attitude research and survey methodology emerged from work that incorporated theories and methods derived from clinical and developmental psychol- ogy. We seek here not only to describe and display the importance of this earlier work, and the critical contributions these areas generated for the study of political behavior in general and public opin- ion research in particular, but also to explicitly encourage the reincor- poration of older models in developmental and clinical psychology into the study of political behavior.
Although some recent investigations into the origins of political behaviors and preferences have begun to broaden by integrating new approaches from a variety of areas, including behav- ior genetics and cognitive neuroscience, with developmental and clinical models, many scholars remain unaware of the historical development or significance of these models and their relevance for the modern study of political attitudes, preferences, and behaviors. These approaches are newly poised to provide useful models and insights to inform our under- standing of the nature of political behavior in more comprehensive and accurate ways.
We begin by tracing the history of developmental and clinical models of psychology in the study of political behavior, highlighting the impor- tance of their contribution for the study of political behavior both his- torically and currently. Our goal here echoes the calls put forth by the National Institutes of Health for the interdisciplinary integration of fields in pursuit of novel resolutions to important social and political challenges, from public health to civic engagement. Publically available data sets, including the Adolescent Health panel studies AddHealth , and funding mechanisms, such as OppNet, are designed to integrate the study of social systems and the nature of behavior.
As such, they offer new opportunities for scholars to leverage historic clinical and developmental models to explore critical current political questions and problems. We begin by discussing some of the historical uses of developmental and clini- cal models in the study of political behavior and then proceed to discuss potential applications in each area independently. Historical Developments In many ways, developmental and clinical approaches provided many of the original foundations for current models in political behavior and polit- ical psychology writ large.
The Georges demonstrated how Wilson repeatedly handled pow- erful male authority figures with whom he came in conflict in a way that derived from his relationship with his father, illustrating the pattern with examples from the conflicts Wilson had with Dean West when he was pres- ident of Princeton University through his ultimately tragic fight with Sena- tor Henry Cabot Lodge over the League of Nations at the end of the First World War.
However, many of these leadership studies, largely restricted to more idiosyncratic case studies, faltered on the basis of their small sam- ple size and inability to replicate or generalize widely across individuals. As the field grew and developed, this limitation gave way to increased focus on models being developed from then-recent developments in social psychology.
This theoretical move coincided with the behavioral revolu- tion in political science taking shape at places like the University of Chi- cago, with its greater emphasis on empirical rigor and replicability. The incorporation of developmental psychology into the study of polit- ical behavior has a long history as well, although its current manifestation is often not recognized to derive from models in developmental psychol- ogy.
However, all of attitudinal survey research, including that which constitutes the basis for public opinion polling and American National Election Studies, was founded on the methodological advances of behav- iorism, which primarily rests on psychological social learning theory. For example, early work in voting studies conducted by Lazarsfeld and col- leagues Lipset et al. This kind of behavioral research became largely incorporated into mainstream political science, albeit without widespread recognition of its origin in psychology.
In the wake of this shift in emphasis, important and valuable new work in the study of political behavior emerged. For example, work epitomized by the so- called Michigan approach displaced purely behavioral models with a more psychological and attitudinal approach to voting. The most notable and influential work in this regard quickly became a classic. The Ameri- can Voter Campbell et al. Such a model posited implicit social processes of group identi- fication but failed to specify the particular psychological mechanisms by which these attachments developed.
However, as political science moved into a more behavioral research tradition, the field largely abandoned its previous integration of other subfields within psychology and thus failed to interrogate the basis of such intergenerational transfer of political party identification. Ironically, this led to the near exclusion of the developmen- tal and clinical traditions that had generated the very models that helped the field survive in the face of the behavioral revolution and that had earlier offered important contributions to our understanding of political leadership in particular.
As a result, the discipline of political science has remained largely alienated from modern work in developmental psychol- ogy and clinical psychiatry while these fields made advances in both meth- ods and theory that redressed earlier limitations and offered potential broader applications in these areas. Today, the majority of psychological models in political science depend primarily on insights largely drawn from models in early social psychology for applications and insights into the nature and foundations of political attitudes and behavior.
Yet modern psychology has grown substantially as a discipline in ways not fully appreciated within the study of political behavior in political science. The rich resources offered by a full recogni- tion of the historical significance and import of developmental and clinical psychology has been largely lost in the investigation of political attitudes, preferences, and behavior. Yet the modern instantiation of such models and arguments remains informative and relevant for many areas of inter- est in political science.
This use of psychology to study politics found adherents among those who, like Solomon Asch and Stanley Milgram in social psy- chology, shared an interest in trying to understand the motivation of Nazi Germany in general, and Hitler in particular, in perpetuating the genocide of Jews in Germany. Other work with mass publics, undertaken using survey methods, such as work on the Authoritarian Personality by Adorno et al. This work came under intense methodological criticism by many who argued that the F-scale, designed to measure such attitudes, was constructed in a biased fashion Brown More recent attempts to capture these beliefs and tie them to systematic political preferences and behavior, with- out falling prey to such methodological faults, come under the rubric of Right-Wing Authoritarianism Altemeyer Classic work in social psychology, such as the work on conformity Asch and obedience Milgram , proved their value by providing important situational motives for behavior that seemed otherwise incomprehensible.
Because such models proved so useful and insightful in the influence of groups Moscovici ; Nemeth and the critical role of situa- tions in influencing outcomes of interest Zimbardo among many other topics, the developing field of political psychology continued to depend on the findings provided by this subfield to the relative neglect of developmental and clinical approaches. This resulted in no small part from the ways in which these approaches remained commensurate with, and reliant upon, the increased use of the survey and statistical analyses noted above.
Because the dominant models of social psychology during this time emphasized the critical role of situation and environments on social behavior, and because such social behavior could be easily and read- ily ascertained through the survey method, the marriage between social and political psychology appeared made in heaven. However, this union served to re-create others in its own image and failed to support progeny whose outlook differed drastically either in ontological origin or method- ological perspective. As political science becomes more integrated with the research findings generated in other fields, including behavioral econom- ics, neuropsychology, genetics, and neurobiology, it becomes increasingly useful, if not necessary, to draw upon the insights generated by clinical and developmental psychology to improve the descriptive accuracy of models of human behavior.
This perspective allows for the incorporation of a broader range of psychological models to more fully and accurately enlighten the enduring and important questions that motivate the study of political preferences. This is important because clinical and developmental approaches have grown substantially in ways that are not fully appreciated within current models of political behavior, but are crucial for explicating neurobiologi- cal approaches that are becoming increasingly common in the field. Devel- opmental and clinical models offer important perspectives for exploring the interplay between the development of individual minds and the social world, including explorations of the interactions between personality, emotion, prejudice and stereotyping, cooperation and aggression, iden- tity and the self, attitudes and persuasion, and issues of perception and interpretation that influence our understanding of the political world.
Making New Garments from Old Cloth 39 Methodologically, they offer innovations that allow for the incorporation of extreme forms of behavior as well as those that lie within the normal range. These psychological models address these important and promi- nent concerns by incorporating models of neural and social development from fetus to adulthood and capturing all those life events, experiences, and biological mechanisms that lead to preferences, perception, values, and goals in many domains.
Such forces guide behavior across domains and inevitably influence political choice. Clinical and developmental approaches today rely on a full complement of experimental, social, famil- ial, longitudinal, and neurobiological methods.
The modern instantiation of such models and arguments remains informative and relevant not only for cataloguing and explicating behaviors, but also for inspiring action to remediate suffering in more effective ways. Such a critical mission has been dissipating from the study of political behavior over the last several decades but continues to be championed by larger psychological science. Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry Clinical psychology encompasses a series of methods that have tradition- ally focused on diagnosis of behavior outside the normal range. This is not so different an approach from that favored in areas of political science that have also focused on extreme cases, such as war.
There are numerous clinical methods that may be of use for the study of political traits. Here we concentrate on the study of extreme behavior because its understand- ing remains central. In clinical work, such efforts are devoted to attempts to alleviate immediate suffering, as well as providing insight into lesser versions of the same phenomena in the normal population.
In a similar manner, political psychology can use such an approach to understand how extreme cases of particular phenomena, for example fear, might inform our understanding of how its manipulation in lesser form can influence political preferences in decisive ways. Models and methods drawn from clinical psychology, which focus on understanding, preventing, and relieving psychological distress or dysfunction, have led to a deep understanding of critical core processes underlying human behaviors such as emotion, anxiety, fear, and affilia- tion.
In particular, clinical approaches identify a condition and then seek to understand extreme manifestations in order to more fully explicate the mechanisms behind the condition and the resulting consequences if left untreated. Identification remains similarly useful for understanding the mechanisms and development of political behavior as well; isolating extreme exemplars of any given phenomenon helps observers to identify the processes by which biology and environ- ment interact to create the expression of a particular thought, feeling, or behavior in a given context.
Examining the sources of such variables at the extremes of a distribution helps us grasp the emergence of these forces within a more normal range. At the very least, investigating specific fac- tors in their purest form can help guide, shape, and generate hypotheses concerning how they might operate in less pronounced form in different populations. One of the premier forefathers of the combination of clinical psychol- ogy and political behaviors was the late Hans Eysenck. His work on intel- ligence and personality set the foundation for much of what we know of each today.
Eysenck , introduced the world to the two basic personality dimensions he theorized, extroversion and neuroticism, both of which he proposed as inherited and genetically influenced. Some sixty years later, countless theories and measures of personality have since emerged, using a variety of measures and scales, the best known of which is the five-factor model or so-called Big Five personality measure, often credited to Costa and McCrae This approach continues to recog- nize extroversion and neuroticism as two core components of personality, though not the only two, as Eysenck believed.
His mea- surement instruments and questions were originally developed through observation of individuals who were either clinically neurotic or, alter- natively, overly dependent on increased activity, social engagement, and other stimulation-seeking behaviors extroverted. The works of Adorno et al. Earlier works in political science engaged this literature McClosky and Bann , but the study of personality and political preferences quieted at the same time that B.
However, the ideas spawned by Eysenck and his contemporaries have resurfaced in arguments surround- ing the importance of clinical methods in exploring social traits. Much of the work that leading personality and politics scholars such as John Jost Jost et al. Eysenck explored the relationship between ideology, attitudes, and personality Eysenck , the genetic nature of personality Eysenck , and even the genetic relationship between personality and attitudes Eaves and Eysenck A half cen- tury later, the vast majority of contemporary research examining the rela- tionship between personality and political attitudes is still being presented in psychology journals Jost et al.
When such work has been published in political science journals, it is more often authored by psychologists Caprara et al. Recent trends demonstrate renewed interest in the relationship between personality and attitudes by political scientists within the political science literature, yet these works remain almost agnostic, if not completely unaware of, the clinical and theoretical origins and aspects of the measures Mondak et al.
Unfortunately, outside of research in personality, modern clinical approaches within political science have virtually disappeared, even for those traits that have major clinical importance. For example, the influ- ence of fear poses a major research agenda for political behavior Brader ; Jost et al. Certainly fear has been tied to ideology in the extant literature Jost et al.
Indeed, critical information on how fears are developed and maintained remains all but absent in political attitude research. Yet clinical approaches have focused on diagnosing and treating fears and phobias and provide valuable information on how political behaviors may or may not be influenced by fear that varies by individual disposition. For example, Ainsworth and Bowlby identified innate fear dispo- sitions based on infant reactions to unfamiliarity; Antony et al.
In combination, these findings contribute interwoven strands into the weave of a larger literature that collectively agrees on the innate determinants of differential underlying fear dispositions Balter that become socially modified and directed. Such findings are critically important for the study of political attitudes, preferences, and behavior, yet have not been integrated into their study in any systematic way.
A great deal of work has been dedicated to identifying how fear motivates individuals to act in certain ways and how it can shift attitudes and vote choice. Additional research has examined how certain fear stimuli can mobilize the public toward a particular candidate or platform. Yet almost no research in this area has attempted to understand the source of such fears, or sought ways to extinguish it in order to protect the greater public from fear-based political rhetoric. In other words, almost no work has yet recognized the critical innate differences in baseline fear that have been already identified in clinical research for an exception, see Hatemi et al.
Importantly, much clinical work has focused on extinguishing fear Phelps and Thomas ; Schiller et al. Indeed, a wide array of phobias and fears exist, but, as with cancer, one treatment does not fit all types. Social phobias are the most difficult to treat, and rarely if ever are cured, while animal and situational phobias are much more amenable to effective treatment.
For example, Hatemi et al. Furthermore, genetic analysis showed that such effects occurred not as a result of social conditioning, as might have been expected and predicted by previous political science models, but rather resulting from basic individual differences in inherent levels of baseline fear. Applying these tools holds obvious implications for treating the increas- ing numbers of veterans returning from our many conflicts overseas and for reducing the huge social costs of post—traumatic stress disorder and other conditions resulting from exposure to combat.
Other avenues might include informing the public about how fear-based political mes- sages activate parts of their biology to inspire or repress action. Without incorporating clinical methods, discovery and categorization of underly- ing etiological factors, divergent manifestations, and targeted treatment programs will not be developed. Clinical methods have helped support public policy goals that strive to use knowledge and action to achieve solutions to pressing public problems, such as helping veterans struggling to readjust to civilian life. Other clinical traits of interest, such as the nature of anxiety, aggres- sion, affiliation, and bonding, hold critical import for the ways in which people form political preferences, take part in local community and national elections, and engage in all those behaviors involving citizenship and participation, including war, that are of critical interest to political psychologists.
These forces affect how people condition those around them, such as their children, to respond to the political world they con- front. While such topics are explored in the political psychology literature, research continues to be conducted largely without the benefit of clinical approaches or measures. Indeed, there are few modern explorations of political traits using a clinical approach in the study of political behavior for an exception, see Post , although numerous explorations out- side that arena of interest exist, pointing to the efficacy and utility of the method.
For example, scholars have examined differences in happiness by ideological disposition Choma, Busseri, and Sadava ; Napier and Jost , psychopathology and political aggression Post , and terrorism and mental pathologies Tood, Wilson, and Casey ; Atran Such knowledge has obvious implications regarding public support for various kinds of antiterror policies. We have provided only a few examples of how clinical approaches might inform the study of politics. The application of clinical research easily extends into other political domains as well, including such com- mon concerns as the study of leadership, cooperation and aggression, and political participation.
In this way, invoking established and validated clinical methods to address a current real problem would allow the study of political behavior to return to one of its original intentions of demon- strating applied policy relevance. Developmental Psychology Despite early forays into the area investigating the psychological processes by which children become politically socialized Greenstein and Tarrow ; Niemi and Jennings , developmental approaches represent perhaps the most underappreciated subfield of political psychology.
The seminal contributions by M. Kent Jennings and colleagues Langton and Jennings assumed that parental child concordance resulted from socialization and implied that children did not possess or form their own unique attitudes. However, two psychol- ogists Hess and Torney established that children do possess inde- pendent attitudes. Their study, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, was based on a novel study of over twelve thousand children from eight major American cities. A recent article by Hatemi et al.
In this study, they used a longitudinal sam- ple of children assessed for political attitudes every two years from ages eight to eighteen. By fifteen, children closely matched the attitude structure, but not necessar- ily the attitudes, of their mothers. The findings hold profound implications for understand- ing parent—child transmission of political attitudes, political cognition and sophistication, and political learning. While some work on child development has explored the origins of psychopathology Erikson and the nature of political socializa- tion in childhood Greenstein and Tarrow , much less research has focused on the way in which prenatal development affects politically sig- nificant behaviors, such as cooperation or aggression.
Yet this area of psy- chology has proven crucial to explicating how the human mind develops throughout our lives, from infancy through childhood and adolescence into adulthood, and holds the key to achieving a better understanding of many aspects of change and constancy in attitudes and behavior over the lifespan. One example suffices to illustrate the critical importance that develop- ment across stages of growth can exert on later behavior. First, prenatal nutrition exerts a significant impact on subsequent child development that can manifest an impact throughout life.
Like puberty and menopause, pregnancy itself constitutes an important developmental stage for those experiencing its effects. Mothers who suffer from depression during pregnancy risk low birth weight and preterm birth in their offspring Grote et al. All these limi- tations serve to isolate affected individuals from peers and adults, leading to enhanced risk for attachment disorders and other personality deficits in addition to whatever cognitive and physiological problems plague them.
The quality of prenatal nutrition affects many women in poor and rural parts of the world who are subjected to famine and other forms of physical and social stress during pregnancy. Little is known about the later influ- ence of such forces on the political and social abilities of their children and the way such factors might affect the development of subsequent political institutions in those societies.
Yet, given what is known about the negative sequelae of drugs and alcohol on prenatal development, such malnutri- tion and psychosocial stress likely exerts a similarly powerful effect on subsequent child growth and learning ability, including moral and social learning. These implications have obvious political ramifications, espe- cially because entire populations may be affected. Studies exploring the effect of famine or genocide on the culture, physical growth, psychological development, and attitudes of those subjected to its effects might prove extremely illuminating and provide ammunition to those seeking to ame- liorate these effects.
For example, the number of infants abandoned or sent to orphanages in eastern Europe reached critical levels in the s due to the severe economic crisis. In certain orphanages, infants were left alone for twenty-three hours a day without affection or stimulation. As a result, they developed significant deficits in a wide variety of domains, including language and the ability to experience normal human empathy and attachment. Such deficits not only encompassed learning deficiencies, but also resulted in stunted neurological development. Simply put their brains did not develop as they should have.
Effects included deficient glu- cose metabolism and impaired neural function Chugani et al. As far as we know, not a single study in politi- cal behavior has explored prenatal conditions as predictors for later life political behavior, despite the critical importance of biological, psycho- logical, and physiological development for all aspects of human behavior. Including developmental approaches can help us to understand how nutrition and other aspects of prenatal care can affect the propensity for violence and resilience in populations subjected to starvation, famine, or other systematic forms of stress such as forced migration.
No one has yet applied the findings above to large-scale social ills such as famine and war, or examined how such effects might lead to permanent changes in brain structure and function in offspring due to malnutrition, lack of social attention, or chronic stress and fear. These forces can be even more severe and endemic in certain regions or populations. For example, rather than tens of thousands of infants being abandoned in eastern Europe for several years, the refugee situation in the Sudan represents a case where hundreds of thousands of infants and children are denied both nutrition and attention over decades.
The long-term political ramifications remain unknown.
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Here we show that instantiations of historically useful models and meth- ods drawn from developmental and clinical psychology can continue to inform our future understanding of the foundations and manifestations of political behavior, just as they have in the past. In particular, we sug- gest that developmental approaches can further our appreciation for the various ways in which environmental factors such as poverty and vio- lence can affect the neurobiological and social development of children, which can exert profound influences on adult political behavior.
In addi- tion, clinical approaches can deepen the contextualization of our knowl- edge of critical dynamics involving the influence of personality on politics, anxiety, and fear. Such a perspective can also explicate individual variance in the expression of other emotions that can in turn affect susceptibility to various forms of political messaging, including campaign advertising, and the subtle interplay between leadership, followership, dominance, aggression, and cooperation.
Both approaches provide not only a means to understand behavior, but also a way to explicate potential mechanisms to engage and specially address problems of human suffering. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and Row. Ainsworth, Mary S. Altemeyer, Robert. Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Winnipeg: University of Man- itoba Press. Antony, Martin M. Swallow, and Richard P. Arendt, Hannah. Asch, Solomon E. Atran, Scott. Balter, Michael.
Bizer, George Y. Krosnick, Allyson L. Holbrook, S. Christian Wheeler, Derek D. Rucker, and Richard E. Bouchard, Thomas J. Segal, and Auke Tellegen. Brader, Ted. Brown, Roger.
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