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- Nicomachean Ethics | Documents
- The Nicomachean Ethics by muhammad uzaır ul haq qazı on Prezi
Iscriviti al corso. Pasqua Ricordo di Gino Stefani. Sconti soggiorni in Cittadella. Corso, Esami e Diplomi. Il corso quadriennale di Musicoterapia della Pro Civitate Christiana richiede la frequenza del Corso This is enough, then, to make it clear that in every case the intermediate state is praised, but we must sometimes incline toward the excess, sometimes toward the deficiency; for that is the easiest way to hit the intermediate and good condition. Dying to avoid poverty or erotic passion or something painful is proper to a coward, not to a brave person.
For shirking burdens is softness, and such a person stands firm [in the face of death] to avoid an evil, not because standing firm is fine. For a lover of the truth who is truthful even when nothing is at stake will be still keener to tell the truth when something is at stake, since he will avoid falsehood as shameful [when something is at stake], having already avoided it in itself [when nothing was at stake]. But doing acts of cowardice or injustice is not doing these actions, except coincidentally; it is being in a certain state when we do them.
Similarly, practicing medicine or healing is not cutting or not cutting, giving drugs or not giving them, but doing all these things in a certain way. As assertion and denial are to thought, so pursuit and avoidance are to desire. Now virtue of character is a state that decides; and decision is a deliberative desire. If, then, the decision is excellent, the reason must be true and the desire correct, so that what reason asserts is what desire pursues. Further, every science seems to be teachable, and what is scientifically knowable is learnable. Let us now make a new start, and say that there are three conditions of character to be avoided—vice, incontinence, and bestiality.
The contraries of two of these are clear; we call one virtue and the other continence. The contrary to bestiality is most suitably called virtue superior to us, a  heroic, indeed divine, sort of virtue. Moreover, someone is not prudent simply by knowing; he must also [8, 9] act on his knowledge. But the incontinent person does not. Some maintain, on the contrary, that we are happy when we are broken on the wheel, or fall into terrible misfortunes, provided that we are  good. Hence friendship has three species, corresponding to the three objects of love.
For each object of love has a corresponding type of mutual loving, combined with awareness of it. But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other insofar as they are good, and they are good in their own right. To those who cite the disgraceful pleasures [to show that pleasure is not a good], we might reply that these [sources of disgraceful pleasures] are not pleasant. Or perhaps pleasures differ in species. Moreover, there are many things that we would be eager for even if they brought no pleasure—for instance, seeing, remembering, knowing, having the virtues.
Even if pleasures necessarily follow on them, that does not matter; for we would choose them even if no pleasure resulted from them.
It would seem to be clear, then, that pleasure is not the good, that  not every pleasure is choiceworthy, and that some are choiceworthy in themselves, differing in species or in their sources [from those that are not]. But what about those pleasures that seem to be decent?
Full Lesson Plan Overview
Of these, which kind, or which particular pleasure, should we take to be the pleasure of a human being? Surely it will be clear from the activities, since the pleasures are consequences of these. Hence the pleasures that complete the activities of the complete and blessedly happy man, whether he has one activity or more than one, will be called the fully human pleasures to the fullest extent. The other pleasures will be human in secondary, or even more remote ways, corresponding to the character of the activities.
For if it were, someone might have it and yet be asleep for his whole life, living the life of a plant, [b] or suffer the greatest misfortunes. If we do not approve of this, we count happiness as an activity rather than a state , as we said before. For happiness lacks nothing, but is self-sufficient. As we have often said, then, what is honorable and pleasant is what is so to the excellent person.
To each type of person the activity that accords with his own proper state is most choiceworthy; hence the activity in accord with virtue is most choiceworthy to the excellent person [and hence is most honorable and pleasant]. Happiness, then, is not found in amusement; for it would be absurd if the end were amusement, and our lifelong efforts and sufferings aimed  at amusing ourselves. But the happy life seems to be a life in accord with virtue, [a] which is a life involving serious actions, and not consisting in amusement.
Then if someone is alive, and action is excluded, and production even more, what is left but study? A sign of this is the fact that other animals have no share in happiness, being completely deprived of this activity of study. But happiness will need external prosperity also, since we are human beings; for our nature is not self-sufficient for study, but we need a healthy body, and need to have food and the other services provided. For self-sufficiency and action do not depend on excess. Clearly, all this is true of  the wise person more than anyone else; hence he is most loved by the gods.
And it is likely that this same person will be happiest; hence, by this argument also, the wise person, more than anyone else, will be happy. It is best, then, if the community attends to upbringing, and  attends correctly. But if the community neglects it, it seems fitting for each individual to promote the virtue of his children and his friends—to be able to do it, or at least to decide to do it.
Further, education adapted to an individual is actually better than a common education for everyone, just as individualized medical treatment is better. First, then, let us try to review any sound remarks our predecessors have made on particular topics.
Then consider signing up for my Monday Medley newsletter. It's a collection of fascinating finds from my week, usually about psychology, technology, health, philosophy, and whatever else catches my interest. I also include new articles, book notes, and podcast episodes. High-Level Thoughts One of the original works of virtue ethics, this book on living a good life by Aristotle has some great advice on being a good, thriving person, through moderating your excesses and deficiencies and striving to improve yourself. Podcast Episode Click here to listen to a podcast based on these book notes.
Nicomachean Ethics | Documents
In he returned to Athens and founded his own school, the Lyceum. Aristotle claims that virtuous activity CONTROLS happiness If virtuous activity controls happiness, we need to know what the relevant virtues are to secure happiness i To be a generous person, I must not only know how to give money on the right occasions, and have generous impulses; I must also direct my capacities and feelings to the right goals, so that I act from the right desires, for the right reasons, and on the right occasions The right moral choice requires experience of particular situations, since general rules cannot be applied mechanically to particular situations.
The value of this pleasure depends on the value of the activity on which the pleasure follows The virtuous person has the most pleasant life; but this life cannot be devoted exclusively to the pursuit of pleasure. Book 2: Virtue of Character Virtue, then, is of two sorts, virtue of thought and virtue of character. Book 3: Preconditions of Virtue Dying to avoid poverty or erotic passion or something painful is proper to a coward, not to a brave person.
The Nicomachean Ethics by muhammad uzaır ul haq qazı on Prezi
Book 5: Justice But doing acts of cowardice or injustice is not doing these actions, except coincidentally; it is being in a certain state when we do them. Book 6: Virtues of Thought As assertion and denial are to thought, so pursuit and avoidance are to desire. Book 7: Incontinence Let us now make a new start, and say that there are three conditions of character to be avoided—vice, incontinence, and bestiality. Book 8: Friendship Hence friendship has three species, corresponding to the three objects of love.